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I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1961, shortly after assuming his new post as Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury for Tax Policy, legal scholar Stanley Surrey issued a challenge to his 
former colleagues in academia and legal practice. The tax system, he said, was 
urgently in need of both repair and renovation. Existing faults were obvious and 
future problems certain. The task ahead was clear. “A complex society such as 
ours, ever growing and changing, must necessarily expect and demand that its tax 
system also keep pace,” he said.1 
Politicians, however, were ill-equipped to confront these looming challenges. 
Public debate on tax reform was lively, but it was also suffused with motivated 
and biased reasoning. “Much of the material presented to the Congress and in 
the public print comes down to an attempt to score debating points,” Surrey 
complained. “There is a good deal of commotion, but it is all thrust and parry.”2 
Compounding the problem, government expertise was in short supply. In 
recent years, the Treasury Department—traditionally the source for 
dispassionate fiscal analysis—had retreated from the field of serious tax research. 
That withdrawal had created a ripple effect in academia where Surrey detected 
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 1.  Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Sec’y of the Treas., Current Tax Problems (Aug. 6, 1961), in 15 
BULL. 20, 22 (1961).  
 2.  Id. at 23. 
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“a distinct lessening” in research on tax issues.3 
In the face of this shortfall, Surrey encouraged his former colleagues in the 
tax trenches and academic ivory tower to assume the mantle of policy leadership. 
“[T]ax knowledge starts with the tax expert,” Surrey intoned with a technocrat’s 
faith in the value of expertise, “be he a legal or accounting practitioner, a research 
consultant in the business world, or an economist or law professor in the 
universities.”4 More specifically, Surrey challenged the organized tax bar to 
undertake some candid introspection. “[O]ur profession has constantly to be 
asking itself as tax lawyers—with a stake in the integrity of the tax system and 
with an integral role in the task of linking that system with our taxpayers—
whether we are doing as much as we can to bring before the Congress and the 
public the needed objectivity and perspective,” he said.5 “How well do we fulfill 
the role that only we can play?”6 
Surrey’s answer to that question must have unsettled his audience, which was 
gathered for a meeting of the American Bar Association’s Section of Taxation. 
To be sure, Surrey acknowledged, tax lawyers were active in the legislative 
process, engaging policy issues and offering guidance to Congress. But typically, 
tax lawyers entered the policy arena as client advocates rather than defenders of 
the tax system, more likely to plead for special provisions than to oppose them. 
They were, in other words, part of the problem, not the solution.7 
Surrey expected more from the bar, and he urged the Tax Section to join the 
Treasury in active defense of the fisc. But he leavened his critique—and 
disappointment—with a certain amount of sympathy. “[P]erhaps we cannot do 
better,” he granted. “Perhaps the attorney-client relationship, be it considered in 
its strict legal framework or as an attitude of loyalty or moral obligation, 
effectively prevents a tax practitioner from speaking his own mind on current 
issues before the Congress and the public.”8 
Surrey’s concession—his recognition that the attorney-client relationship 
imposed constraints on the civic role of the tax professional—underscored a long-
running tension within the organized tax bar. The American Bar Association 
(ABA) did not establish its official Section of Taxation (Section) until 1939, but 
predecessor ABA divisions had been working on tax issues since 1906. These 
groups continued to struggle for more than half a century to define a workable 
public role for the profession collectively and tax lawyers individually. This 
struggle, moreover, had unfolded amidst a complex and rapidly changing 
environment, both for the legal profession and the American fiscal state. 
 
 
 3.  Id. at 21. 
 4.  Id. at 23.  
 5.  Id. at 24. 
 6.  Id. at 23.  
 7.  Id. at 24. 
 8.  Id. 
MEHROTRA AND THORNDIKE_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2018  4:34 PM 
No. 2 2018]       THE ORGANIZED TAX BAR AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 205 
 
The Section’s record on this score was decidedly mixed. As Surrey 
acknowledged, the group had sometimes entered policy debates as champions of 
sound taxation.9 Other times, however, individual tax lawyers had served 
principally as client advocates, lobbying Congress for “special provisions” that 
granted favorable treatment to particular taxpayers or groups.10 Such special 
pleading was often high-profile—and effective. 
Perhaps most often, Section leaders had opted for discretion over valor, 
choosing to neither indict nor defend proposals that undermined the tax system, 
its fairness, or its revenue productivity. In Surrey’s view, this policy of considered 
silence was actually a modest achievement for the organized bar, given the 
importance of client responsibilities. “Perhaps the tax practitioner must restrict 
himself to the negative restraint of advising his clients against rushing to defend 
positions that cannot and should not be defended,” he declared, “and certainly 
such a role would be useful.”11 
Still, Surrey hoped for more. “[T]he search must continue for ways by which 
the tax practitioner can fulfill the responsibility, which society can rightfully place 
on him, to make his professional wisdom as fully available as possible in 
advancing the public interest in an improved tax system,” he told his colleagues.12 
This article tells the story of that search during the first six decades of the 
twentieth century, beginning with the early pre-history of the formal ABA Tax 
Section and continuing through the crucial decade and half that followed World 
War II. These years were crucial, but not because the tax bar managed, during 
this period, to resolve the fundamental tension between its civic and client 
responsibilities. Indeed, that tension is not susceptible to resolution, since it arises 
from fundamental elements of our modern legal and revenue systems. The tax 
bar inhabits, of necessity, the gray areas of the tax law—those regions of 
uncertainty and opportunity that make the income tax more flexible, more 
malleable, and arguably more fair than alternative systems with brighter lines and 
clearer responsibilities. 
Although there is a significant scholarly literature on the history of the 
organized U.S. bar,13 there are relatively fewer studies of how American tax 
lawyers have struggled to find a unified voice, let alone histories that trace the 
professional dilemmas of U.S. tax lawyers. The writings that exist frequently use 
 
 9.  Stanley S. Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist—How Special Tax Provisions Get 
Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1170–75 (1957). 
 10.  Id. at 1146–47.  
 11.  Surrey, supra note 1, at 24. 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  See, e.g., GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS: THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE 
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 1870–1970 (1970) (providing the institutional 
history of the origins and development of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York); EDSON 
R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS WORK (1953) (providing 
the history of the origins and early decades of the American Bar Association); see also JAMES WILLARD 
HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS (1950).  
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anniversaries of the 1939 founding of the ABA Tax Section to celebrate the 
Section’s role in furthering the aims of the tax law subfield.14 Moving beyond 
anniversary celebrations, other scholars have focused on how the organized tax 
bar helped facilitate the dominance of tax attorneys over other tax professionals, 
such as economists and accountants.15 
By contrast, this article seeks to uncover the historical challenges faced by the 
tax bar’s dual role as client advocate and defender of the fisc. It focuses on the 
formative years of the tax law subfield: the first half of the twentieth century when 
the fledgling field of tax law evolved from a fragmented and neglected subset of 
the American legal profession to become an organized voice for the growing 
group of elite lawyers specializing in tax law. 
Indeed, these were the years when tax lawyers first emerged as a discrete 
subgroup within the broader American legal profession. Not coincidentally, they 
were also the first years in which tax lawyers tried to grapple with the moral and 
political complexities of their role in the new American fiscal state. The early 
decades of the twentieth century, in particular, were a transformative era for the 
U.S. legal profession. These years marked the tail end of what legal historian 
Robert W. Gordon has described as the shift from “liberal legal science” to 
“progressive legal science”—a shift in which elite corporate lawyers became key 
intermediaries between state and society.16 Within the emerging tax bar, elite 
corporate lawyers evolved at this time to become much more than mere 
courtroom representatives for big business. They did more than simply dispute 
tax controversies. They also became valued counselors helping construct tax-
efficient commercial transactions and securing state-sponsored tax benefits for 
their large corporate clients.17 
The first fifty years of the twentieth century were also transformative ones for 
American public finance. Old fiscal tools were disappearing and new ones taking 
their place. At the state level, a variety of general property taxes—long criticized 
by fiscal reformers for being arbitrary, overlapping, and unenforceable—were 
giving way to state-level income taxes and, by the 1930s, general sales taxes. In 
Washington, meanwhile, policymakers were trying to grapple with the growing 
inability of tariff duties to adequately fund the federal government. Like their 
state-level counterparts, national political leaders increasingly looked to income 
 
 14.  See, e.g., Phillip L. Mann, A Brief History of the Tax Section, 1939–2014, 68 TAX LAW. 13 (2014) 
(commending the expanding size and influence of the Section); Harry K. Mansfield, A Brief Unofficial 
History of the Tax Section—1939-1989, 44 TAX LAW. 4 (1990) (celebrating the 75th anniversary of the 
Section and reflecting on its accomplishments); Robert N. Miller, History of Section of Taxation, 8 BULL. 
12 (1954) (chronicling the early history of the Section). 
 15.  See, e.g., Mindy Herzfeld, How Lawyers Dominate: A History of the ABA Tax Section (Geo. U. 
Law Ctr., Working Paper, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3070433 [https://perma.cc/GY5F-T6KP]. 
 16.  Robert W. Gordon, The American Legal Profession, 1870–2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE 
HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND AFTER (1920–) 73, 87–98 (Michael 
Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).  
 17.  Id.  
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taxes as a long-term solution. 
The confluence of these professional and governmental changes helped shape 
the emergence of the organized tax bar. Most fundamentally, the growing scope 
and complexity of American tax systems—at every level of government—created 
a demand for sophisticated professional guidance. At the same time, that same 
scope and complexity created ethical and political pitfalls for lawyers trying to 
advise their clients on their new fiscal responsibilities. 
The inflection points in this history of professional development came, as they 
did for so many other aspects of American society, during the two world wars. In 
the First World War, the federal tax system grew from modest beginnings into a 
fiscal workhorse, raising the enormous revenue needed to prosecute a global war. 
By the end of the Second World War, the tax system had reached a level of 
complexity and sophistication that renders it recognizable as the direct ancestor 
of our current fiscal state. The tax system of 2018 is much different from the one 
of 1948, but the family resemblance is unmistakable.  An understanding of the 
problems and tensions that tax lawyers faced in the early postwar decades helps 
illuminate how the same struggles are playing out today. 
Surrey’s comments on the civic responsibilities of the tax bar came as the legal 
profession was trying to take stock of its new role in the post-WWII fiscal state. 
His call to action (and introspection) coincided with the emergence of new 
opportunities for tax practitioners. But it also came amidst growing concerns 
about the moral status of aggressive tax avoidance—and the lawyers who made 
it possible. As Surrey and his colleagues pondered the future of their profession 
and its stewardship of the tax system, they stood self-consciously, if uneasily, on 
the precipice of both professional opportunity and civic responsibility. 
Part II of this paper describes the earliest incarnations of an organized tax 
bar, including predecessors to the modern ABA Tax Section that appeared in the 
early years of the twentieth century. Initially, these ad hoc groups focused on 
issues of fiscal coordination, both among the states and between the states and 
the federal government. Part III considers the transformative impact of World 
War I, which prompted the ABA’s committee on taxation to grapple with a host 
of new issues. A much-expanded income tax, implemented quickly between 1916 
and 1918, remained a fixture of federal finance in the postwar decade. Although 
still small when measured by the number of taxpayers, it was clearly poised to 
become a central element of American public finance—and American political 
culture. 
Part IV describes the evolution of the tax bar in the crucial decade of the 
1930s, when activist tax policy emanating from the Treasury Department (and 
occasionally from the White House) helped put the spotlight on the moral status 
of tax avoidance. While most of this debate focused on individual taxpayers of 
some notoriety, the tax bar also found itself under attack for its role in facilitating 
creative tax avoidance. 
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Part V considers the first decade and a half of the postwar era, including 
efforts to ease some of the tax systems more redistributive elements, including 
the high marginal tax rates applied to both individual and corporate incomes. The 
war itself had provided a respite from most, but not all, arguments about tax 
avoidance. But the prosperous years of the 1950s ignited a boom market for legal 
services, with tax specialists marketing a variety of creative planning innovations. 
These renewed efforts at vigorous tax minimization helped revive political debate 
about the moral status of legal tax avoidance—and prompted some genuine 
introspection within the tax bar about the civic obligations of private-sector tax 
practitioners. 
Part VI considers the challenge that Stanley Surrey posed to the tax section, 
first in 1957 and then again in 1961. From his lofty perch near the pinnacle of the 
tax policy establishment, Surrey raised difficult—and deeply uncomfortable—
questions about the civic responsibilities of the private bar. He also offered a few 
tentative answers, but none that fully resolved the inherent tension between a tax 
lawyer’s duties to both client and country. Part VII, the conclusion, considers the 
implication of Surrey’s critique for modern tax practice. 
II 
THE EARLY ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF ABA TAX ORGANIZATIONS 
Nearly six decades before Surrey described the challenges of the tax 
legislative process, American lawyers faced similar professional dilemmas about 
the tension between their public and private roles. Before the permanent national 
income tax was established in 1913, many prominent business lawyers were 
struggling with subnational tax issues, especially the inconsistent and often 
overlapping application of state and local property taxes. These lawyers also had 
to face the moral and professional challenges of whether their role was to help 
private clients limit their tax obligations or whether they had a civic duty to 
improve the existing tax system by making property tax laws more rational, 
coherent, and uniform. This tension coincided with dramatic changes to the 
national economy that were having profound effects on the existing tax regime 
and the practice of law. 
Although the ABA reluctantly provided avenues to address the discrepancies 
in state and local taxes, the topic of subnational tax reform became too 
cumbersome, too time-consuming, and perhaps most important, too political for 
the ABA. As a result, the tax bar remained a fragmented and disorganized 
subfield of the profession—at least until the enactment of the Sixteenth 
Amendment and the onset of World War I forever altered the fiscal landscape. 
The pre-history of the formally organized tax bar was, thus, marked by a deep 
ambivalence that has continued to trouble the professional subfield of tax law. 
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A. Pre-history of the Organized Tax Bar 
Throughout the late nineteenth century, the increasing acceleration of 
interstate commerce, led mainly by the railroads, disrupted the taxing sovereignty 
of many state and local governments.18 The general property tax, which provided 
the main source of funding for most state and local governments at the time, 
formally applied to all property within a taxing jurisdiction—real and personal 
property, as well as tangible and intangible.19 As the existence and ownership of 
real property stretched across local and state boundaries, however, there was 
great uncertainty about which jurisdiction had taxing authority. A company or 
individual located in one jurisdiction could own property and conduct business 
across many taxing jurisdictions. Although real property could be assessed and 
taxed where it was situated, the growing importance of intangible personal 
property, namely corporate stocks and bonds, only exacerbated the chaos and 
confusion.20 
As government tax officials struggled to make sense of conflicting and 
overlapping tax authority, business lawyers both lamented the confusion and 
exploited it for their clients’ financial interests. New York business lawyer 
Theodore C. Sutro was a frequent critic of the existing subnational tax regime. 
“Double and multiple taxation are a fact and a crying evil in our American 
systems of taxation,” Sutro announced at a 1908 gathering of tax experts. To 
mitigate against multiple taxation, Sutro called upon government officials to 
consider “agreements or comity between the States.”21 At the same time, business 
leaders and their legal representatives did not hesitate in turning to local and state 
political machines to extract favors, such as under-assessments of property and 
other forms of intentional neglect, in exchange for campaign contributions.22 
The problem of “double and multiple taxation” coincided with dramatic 
changes in the American economy and legal profession. In the decades that 
straddled the turn of the twentieth century, the social and political dislocations 
 
 18.  See generally Cortlandt Parker, President of the Ass’n, Address of Cortlandt Paker (1884), in 7 
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 147 (1884) (communicating noteworthy changes in statutory law among the states at 
the American Bar Association’s annual meeting).  
 19.  See John Joseph Wallis, A History of the Property Tax in America, in PROPERTY TAXATION 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 123, 138 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 2001) (discussing the universality 
provision, which required that all forms of wealth be taxed).  
 20.  See GLENN W. FISHER, THE WORST TAX?: A HISTORY OF THE PROPERTY TAX IN AMERICA 
83–93 (1996); JON C. TEAFORD, THE RISE OF THE STATES: EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN STATE 
GOVERNMENT 43 (2002). 
 21.  Theodore Sutro, Double and Multiple Taxation, in 2 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, SECOND 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 547, 554 (1908). 
 22.  R. RUDY HIGGENS-EVENSON, THE PRICE OF PROGRESS: PUBLIC SERVICES, TAXATION, AND 
THE AMERICAN CORPORATE STATE, 1877 TO 1929, at 44–51(2003); C. K. YEARLEY, THE MONEY 
MACHINES: THE BREAKDOWN AND REFORM OF GOVERNMENTAL AND PARTY FINANCE IN THE 
NORTH, 1860–1920, at 114 (1970). 
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wrought by the excesses of free-market “proprietary capitalism” soon led to what 
historian Martin J. Sklar has referred to as “the corporate reconstruction of 
American capitalism.” The consolidation of large-scale industrial corporations 
created new relationships between state and society. As the public sector became 
more reliant upon private business, it sought to regulate these large industrial 
firms. In short, the rise of big business during this period precipitated the 
subsequent emergence of the modern administrative and regulatory state.23 
Lawyers, invariably, found themselves at the center of these new 
relationships. They were often mediators between big business and the rising 
regulatory, administrative, fiscal state. In earlier periods, elite lawyers often 
identified themselves almost exclusively as zealous trial advocates for their 
clients’ legal interests, mainly the enforcement of property and contract rights. 
They spent most of their time helping clients resolve disputes in court, including 
tax controversies. But by the early twentieth century, elite American lawyers 
were moving beyond common-law courts into corporate boardrooms, using their 
professional networks and technical expertise as transactional engineers to 
broker big deals and execute complex commercial transactions.24 The tax bar in 
many ways would come to mirror this broader transformation in the profession. 
This shift took place only gradually as the enactment of new federal income tax 
laws and the dramatic increase in WWI progressive tax rates added layers of legal 
complexity and raised the stakes of tax work, thus pushing the subfield to 
galvanize its organizational efforts. 
Indeed, before WWI catapulted the federal income tax onto the agenda of 
most prominent lawyers, the tax bar struggled to find a unified voice. The lack of 
comity within state and local taxation apparently was not enough of a compelling 
rationale to unify business lawyers. Despite numerous attempts by advocates 
such as Theodore Sutro, the ABA was reluctant to create a separate tax section. 
Yet the need for some sort of response was obvious, and in the early 1900s, the 
ABA referred tax law issues to three separate ABA committees: the Committee 
for Uniform State Laws, the Committee on Commercial Law, and the Committee 
on Jurisprudence and Law Reform.25 None of these three committees was eager 
to take on the task of studying the lack of comity in subnational tax laws, let alone 
harmonizing the vast array of conflicting state and local tax laws. In fact, it was 
not until 1906 that the ABA created a special Standing Committee on Taxation, 




 23.  See generally NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN 
BUSINESS, 1895–1904 (1985); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN 
CAPITALISM, 1890–1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND POLITICS (1988).  
 24.  See generally Gordon, supra note 16. 
 25.  References to the work of these committees appear in the A.B.A.’s Annual Reports between 
1902 and 1906.  
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The early attempts at creating a unified tax bar floundered mainly because 
ABA leaders could not agree on how to deploy the Association’s scarce resources 
to assist lawyers struggling with conflicting and overlapping state and local tax 
laws. For some ABA leaders, even the fundamental project of empirically 
documenting double and multiple taxation was too onerous and time-consuming. 
The work of academics such as Carl Phlen demonstrated that verifying the 
variation in state and local tax laws and the lack of comity was a tremendous 
undertaking.26 Other ABA leaders believed the Association should focus its time 
and energy on more concrete and urgent projects, such as harmonizing state 
property laws or developing a national commercial code. These lawyers were 
happy to leave tax issues to other civic organizations such as the National Tax 
Association (NTA), which was quickly filling the void left by the ABA.27 
Still others thought that taxation, as a branch of political economy, was too 
controversial a topic for the ABA. From the start, the ABA was created to be 
the leading voice for American lawyers everywhere. Its strength came from 
having a unified voice for all sectors of the profession, from big city elite 
corporate attorneys to rural solo practitioners.28 Thus, many ABA members were 
loath to take positions on politically controversial topics that could potentially 
divide the Association. Initially, taxation was one such topic. “I do not like the 
effort that I see to discuss questions of political economy,” proclaimed Henry 
Ingersoll of Tennessee at a 1907 ABA meeting, “and all other subjects which are 
not included within the purposes of the organization [like] Taxation!”29 For ABA 
leaders like Ingersoll, there was a clear divide between law and politics, and 
taxation was evidently on the side of politics. 
Indeed, for many traditional American lawyers, taxation was one of the 
critical topics that divided the “science” of law from the raw power of politics. As 
historian Morton Horwitz has shown, one of the central tenets of the “classical 
legal thought” that dominated turn-of-the-twentieth century American 
jurisprudence was a commitment to a “neutral, non-distributive state.”30 Lawyers 
 
 26.  See generally DEP’T OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, SPECIAL REPORTS OF THE CENSUS OFFICE, 
WEALTH, DEBT, AND TAXATION (1907). Carl Plehn authored Part III of the overall report, which was 
considered “the most comprehensive yet attempted and that it will be the most useful to all interested in 
the subject of taxation.” See id. at xi.  
 27.  Compare Ajay K. Mehrotra & Joseph J. Thorndike, From Programmatic Reform to Social 
Science Research: The National Tax Association and the Promise and Perils of Disciplinary Encounters, 
45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 593, 602 (2011) (discussing the NTA’s criticism of the American Bar Association’s 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law), with Comm. on Taxation, Report of the 
Committee on Taxation, 31 ANN. REP. A.B.A 540, 541 (1908) (reporting on the progress other 
associations in the area of uniform taxation, including the NTA). 
 28.  See generally ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAWYER: A SUMMARY OF THE 
SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1954); SUNDERLAND, supra note 13. 
 29.  Henry Ingersoll, Transactions of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Bar 
Association, Held at Narragansett Pier, Rhode Island, 28 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 3, 127 (1905). 
 30.  MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS 
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 5 (1992); see ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF 
ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861–1913, at 6 (1993). 
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reared in this legal orthodoxy—those who grew up with the treatises of Thomas 
M. Cooley and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to strike down the 1894 income 
tax—believed that legal science could not tame tax law. By definition, taxation 
implicated the potentially redistributive powers of government. Such 
redistribution pitted one class against another and thus was not a legitimate area 
of scientific legal study or action. Henry Ingersoll’s rebuke to ABA leaders for 
even discussing topics like taxation thus exemplified the reigning legal orthodoxy. 
B. The First ABA Tax Entity 
Despite the ABA’s initial hesitation in providing a formal channel for tax 
issues, by 1906 the Association created a special Standing Committee on 
Taxation.31 Like the entities before it, this new panel suffered from a variety of 
familiar problems, including a lack of focus and resources.32 In its first official 
report, its members stressed the need for the fledgling tax bar to take an active 
professional role in bringing comity to state-level tax laws. State and local 
governments across the country, the report claimed, were focused mainly on 
maximizing their own tax revenues to the determent of large businesses and 
neighboring tax authorities. These governmental units were imposing taxes on 
properties and at rates that frequently conflicted with adjacent jurisdictions. The 
lack of comity was a perennial issue. But it had taken on a new urgency, the 
committee claimed, because the lack of uniformity was encouraging widespread 
tax evasion. The property tax laws “remain on the statute books rather as 
incentives to evasion and fraud in the dealings of the citizens with the state than 
as a means of raising a revenue for public purposes.”33 Concerned about how 
disparities in state tax laws were undermining confidence in the rule of law, the 
committee had hoped to secure ABA resources to catalogue the many existing 
state property tax law discrepancies and then convene a national conference of 
state delegates to rectify the lack of uniformity. The committee, in sum, seemed 
moved by its civic duty to improve the tax system in the name of the public good. 
Yet just as earlier attempts to study and improve the existing tax system fell 
on deaf ears, so too did the requests issued by the new Standing Committee in 
1907.34 Although there was some collaboration between the ABA and the NTA, 
 
 31.  See Report of the Committee Appointed at the Meeting to Report Upon the Advisability of 
Amending the Constitution by Providing for a Standing Committee on Taxation, 28 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 
529, 529–30 (1905). 
 32.  The inaugural members consisted of: Theodore Sutro (NYC, NY), Jacob Klien (St. Louis, MO), 
Frederick N. Judson (St. Louis, MO), Amasa M. Eaton (Providence, RI), Fabius H. Busbee (Raleigh 
NC), and Albert W. Biggs (Memphis, TN). Although the committee’s implicit goal was to remedy the 
problems of “double and multiple taxation,” there was no clear mandate beyond the general directive of 
taking “some active steps looking to remedial legislation in regard to obtaining some uniformity among 
the various states.” Id. at 530. Over time, this vague task would undermine the committee’s stability. 
 33.  Comm. on Taxation, Report of the Committee on Taxation, 30 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 670, 671 (1907). 
 34.  Although the ABA did grant the committee $200 in response to its requests, committee leaders 
reported that the sum was not “sufficient even to warrant our commencing the proposed work.” Comm. 
on Taxation, Report of the Committee on Taxation, 31 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 540, 540 (1908). 
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which at the time comprised an interdisciplinary mix of lawyers, economists, and 
state and local tax officials, no unified voice represented the subfield of tax law 
or the tax bar. The ABA seemed satisfied that organizations such as the NTA 
were helping to unify tax expertise, even if they were not advancing the interests 
of tax lawyers per se. 
After the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified in 1913 and the first peacetime 
federal income tax was adopted, the Standing Committee did issue a report—its 
last—criticizing the new national income tax law. The report, presented at the 
1914 meeting, summarized how the general arrangement of the tax law was 
haphazard, difficult to reference, and filled with ambiguous terms. It even 
provided a long list of recommendations to remedy these defects.35 Tax experts 
outside of the law hailed the report not only for its comprehensive breadth and 
depth, but perhaps more importantly for its political neutrality. One publication 
reported that “while [the report] indulges in many and detailed criticisms of the 
existing law, these, in the main, must be regarded as uncontroversial from a 
political or economic point of view, and as looking merely toward an 
improvement of the law from a formal and technical standpoint.”36 
Despite these accolades, ABA leaders did not believe that the Standing 
Committee served an important function. The lack of comity among state 
property tax laws remained a vexing issue to be sure, but it was a topic that other 
organizations, such as the NTA, were better equipped to handle. A new national 
income tax may have drawn greater attention to tax law issues, especially if the 
technical administration of the new law was lacking. Nonetheless, given that the 
initial income tax rates were relatively low and affected only a small fraction of 
wealthy Americans, the organized bar had little impetus to devote scarce 
resources to this potentially emerging subfield. In short, there were not enough 
good reasons to continue to support the ABA Standing Committee on Taxation, 
and as a result it was disbanded soon after filing its 1914 report. 
III 
WORLD WAR I, THE 1920S, AND THE NASCENT TAX BAR 
Taxation may have suffered from the ABA’s benign neglect in the first 
decades of the twentieth century, but there were other institutions and broader 
forces that would come to shape the emergence of a federal tax bar. During WWI, 
the national government itself would play a major role in unifying elite corporate 
lawyers into a new and developing tax law subfield. These corporate lawyers 
turned wartime statesmen and government bureaucrats would become leading 
 
 35.  See generally Comm. on Taxation, Report of the Committee on Taxation, 37 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 
533 (1914) (discussing various aspects of the law, including its provisions on deductions, returns, and 
penalties). 
 36.  American Bar Association Committee Reports, 18 LAW NOTES 145, 147 (1914); see also Roy G. 
Blakey, Amending the Federal Income Tax, 58 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.  SCI. 32, 41 (1915) 
(concluding that the law had various technical flaws but that it was “sound in its fundamental principles”). 
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tax attorneys after the conflict. As a result of their wartime government service 
and their new private roles, these newly minted tax lawyers viewed their 
professional role with a mix of patriotic pride and private consternation. As the 
intellectual predecessors of Stanley Surrey, they understood that they stood at 
the intersection of lucrative professional opportunities and enduring civic 
responsibilities. 
 A. The WWI Fiscal Revolution 
Although the adoption of the 1913 federal income tax launched the need for 
greater attention to tax law, at least at the national level, the professional practice 
of federal tax law remained rather stillborn. All that began to change with the 
onset of WWI. Indeed, the Great War was a watershed event for the modern 
American fiscal state. Before the war, the early federal income tax raised little 
revenue and touched only a small fraction of wealthy Americans, roughly 2% of 
the labor force.37 By the end of the conflict, taxes on personal income and 
business profits eclipsed all other forms of taxation. Marginal individual income 
tax rates skyrocketed from a pre-tax height of 7% to a top figure of 77%, and the 
percentage of the labor force filing income taxes climbed to nearly 20%. 
Innovative new business levies, including an excess profits and war profits tax, 
added an unprecedented layer of complexity to the enforcement and collection 
of national taxes and further enhanced tax revenues. As a result, by 1919, income 
and profits taxes accounted for roughly half of all federal revenues. Although 
exemption levels decreased during the conflict, the wartime tax system retained 
a distinctive “soak-the-rich” characteristic. And soak the rich it did—the effective 
tax rate of the nation’s wealthiest 1% of households soared from about 3% in 
1916 to 15% within two years.38  In short, the development of the wartime tax 
regime, as historian David M. Kennedy has noted, “occasioned a fiscal revolution 
in the United States.”39 
Surprisingly, the WWI fiscal revolution did not alter the ABA’s ambivalence 
towards the nascent tax bar. After all, the Standing Committee on Taxation, 
 
 37.  See JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 78 
(1985). 
 38.  W. Elliot Brownlee, Historical Perspectives on U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich, in DOES ATLAS 
SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 45 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000); John 
Joseph Wallis, Table Ea758-772 - Federal income tax rates, by income group–average rates: 1913–1970, 
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: MILLENNIAL EDITION ONLINE, 
http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSWeb/toc/tableToc.do?id=Ea758-772 [https://perma.cc/AKJ7-5X27] (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2018).  
 39.  DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 112 
(1980); see also THOMAS J. KNOCK, TO END ALL WARS: WOODROW WILSON AND THE QUEST FOR A 
NEW WORLD ORDER (1992) (history of Woodrow Wilson’s views on diplomacy and his attempts to 
create a new world order); Anne L. Alstott & Ben Novick, War, Taxes, and Income Redistribution in the 
Twenties: The 1924 Veterans’ Bonus and the Defeat of the Mellon Plan, 59 TAX L. REV. 373, 380–92 (2006) 
(providing the history of 1920s tax policy and the pivotal role of social movements in limiting the 
retrenchment of progressive taxation). 
MEHROTRA AND THORNDIKE_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2018  4:34 PM 
No. 2 2018]       THE ORGANIZED TAX BAR AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 215 
 
which had been created in 1906 after much hesitation and hand-wringing, was 
disbanded in 1916, just as the war was intensifying in Europe. In fact, there was 
no official ABA tax entity until 1923, when the Association created a Special 
Committee on Internal Revenue Law and its Means of Collection. 
While the ABA may have been neglecting taxation as a key topic, broader 
social and geo-political forces were shaping the emergence of a tax bar. The 
Great War’s fiscal revolution necessitated a tremendous influx of administrative 
personnel into Washington. As historian Robert C. Cuff has noted, “[a]n 
administrative army marched into Washington before a military force sailed 
overseas.”40 Among the lieutenants and foot soldiers in this administrative army 
were numerous elite corporate lawyers who joined the U.S. Treasury 
Department and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to help build the legal 
infrastructure for the wartime fiscal state. Their ranks included, among others, 
Russell C. Leffingwell, Undersecretary of the Treasury, Daniel C. Roper, the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and Arthur B. Ballantine, Solicitor of 
Internal Revenue. These well-trained and powerful tax practitioners not only 
recruited their protégés and others into the wartime fiscal state; they also went 
on to form the foundation of the fledgling postwar federal tax bar.41 
The sheer volume and complexity of the wartime income and profits levies 
required the increasing services of professional tax experts, especially lawyers. 
Nowhere was this more apparent than within the BIR—the unit within the U.S. 
Treasury Department that was charged with interpreting, assessing, and 
collecting the new taxes, including the highly complex and untried excess-profits 
tax. Under Roper’s leadership, the BIR grew enormously. Between 1913 and 
1920, the number of BIR personnel increased roughly four-fold, from about 4,000 
to roughly 16,000 employees.42 Although it is difficult to discern how many of 
these new employees were legal professionals, there is no doubt that Roper and 
the other leading Treasury lawyers recognized the need for more lawyers within 
the government. 
To fill their staff with lawyers, the Treasury officials turned to their 
professional networks and recruited young attorneys in a variety of ways. Given 
his past experiences shuttling between the public and private sectors, Roper 
understood that public sector knowledge and training could translate into future 
private benefits. Government work could lead subsequently to private riches. As 
leading postwar tax lawyers E. Barrett Prettyman, Sr. and Albert L. Hopkins 
later recalled, Roper recruited young lawyers, including Washington’s first “lady 
lawyers,” with appeals to patriotic duty and remarks about how “this tax business 
 
 40.  ROBERT D. CUFF, THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD: BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 
DURING WORLD WAR I, at 1 (1973). 
 41.  AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW, POLITICS, 
AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877–1929, at 293–348 (2013). 
 42.  ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 540 (1940); W. ELLIOT 
BROWNLEE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A SHORT HISTORY 56 (2d ed. 2014). 
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is likely to develop into quite a thing for lawyers.”43 Thus, from the start, the 
national tax bar reflected a mix of public and private motives. Young attorneys 
may have taken to tax during the war to help the Wilson Administration make 
the world “safe for democracy,” but they did not appear to lose sight of how they 
would be able to capitalize on their patriotic service soon after the war. 
The new generation of state-building, national tax lawyers who came of age 
during World War I was unique. They were unlike previous or subsequent 
cohorts of progressive law reformers, who would similarly struggle with the 
dilemmas of professional responsibility. Their predecessors, the first generation 
of Progressive law reformers, began their careers at the turn of the century 
primarily as business lawyers. But, over time, this generation created and staffed 
public-interest organizations outside of their private practice, such as 
administrative and investigative commissions, to fulfill their social reform desires 
and ambitions.44 By contrast, the wartime Treasury lawyers worked with and for 
the state during a pivotal moment in the development of American tax law and 
policy. The senior Treasury lawyers, like Leffingwell and Ballantine, came from 
prestigious northeast corporate law practices, but the war experience seemed to 
transform these individuals. Before their government service, they were highly 
talented, if somewhat cautious, corporate lawyers. Afterwards, they returned to 
the private sector as income tax advocates and leaders of the new federal tax bar, 
willing to convince their legal brethren that the progressive income tax was here 
to stay.45 
The war experience similarly shaped the junior tax soldiers in the Treasury 
Department’s administrative army. Because they began their careers in the 
public sector as Treasury clerks or BIR lawyers, these attorneys may have been 
infused during an early and formative period of their professionalization with a 
greater sense of the public good. Unlike a subsequent generation of post-World 
War II, socially minded lawyers who began their careers working in civil society 
for public-interest organizations, the WWI government tax lawyers appeared to 
have a greater faith and confidence in the public sector, perhaps because they 
grew up alongside the modern American fiscal state. It is no coincidence that, 
after the war, many of the WWI government lawyers became instrumental in 
working with the newly created Joint Committee on Internal Revenue 
Taxation.46 In this sense, these key leaders of the newly emerging tax bar were 
lawyer-statesman, or at least lawyer-bureaucrats, well before they were private 
tax lawyers. This unique chronology of professionalization may have played some 
part in the willingness of these lawyers, both senior and junior, to push for 
 
 43.  MEHROTRA, supra note 41, at 312. 
 44.  Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255, 267–68 
(1990). 
 45.  MEHROTRA, supra note 41, at 408. 
 46.  See generally George K. Yin, James Couzens, Andrew Mellon, the “Greatest Tax Suit in the 
History of the World,” and the Creation of the Joint Committee on Taxation and Its Staff, 66 TAX L. REV. 
787, 854–78 (2013).   
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reforming and retaining the income tax after the war—a position that may have 
been against the interests of their corporate clients. 
B. The 1920s 
After the war, the dramatic shift in national politics and policymaking led to 
numerous calls to dismantle the wartime tax state. The Republican politicians 
who swept into office in 1920 did so with a platform of retrenchment. Their goal 
was to return the American economy and society to, as President Harding put it, 
“normalcy.” Under the key leadership of the new Treasury Secretary Andrew 
Mellon, Republican leaders gradually began to undo the wartime “soak-the-rich” 
tax regime. They slashed top marginal income tax rates from a wartime high of 
77% to 25% by the end of the decade. They abolished the complex and detested 
excess and war profits taxes. And, as a result, effective tax rates on the wealthiest 
American households declined from a 1920 high of 22% to roughly 9% by 1930.47 
Despite these changes, the federal tax regime did not return to pre-war levels. 
The conflict had forever altered the fiscal landscape. Although rates declined and 
some of the most complex levies were eliminated, federal income taxation had 
become embedded in the national legal system. In the process, it also became 
“quite a thing for lawyers” just as Roper had anticipated. The elite law firms in 
New York and Washington, D.C. quickly realized the importance of tax work to 
their practice. As Robert Swaine, the historian of the Cravath & Henderson firm 
noted, after the war “tax work had taken on importance as a specialty requiring 
constant attention.”48 With such constant attention came greater revenue. For the 
Washington, D.C. firm of Covington, nearly half of the firm’s fees came from tax 
work during the post-WWI decade.49 
The growing specialization of a national tax practice signaled the arrival of 
tax law as a significant subfield. Moreover, taxation was influencing many other 
areas of law—not only business law but tertiary areas of the profession as well. 
“With the increasing intrusion of federal tax questions into the practice of almost 
every member of the bar, that unusual institution commonly miscalled ‘The 
Treasury Bar’ has come to have a growing significance to the members of the 
profession generally,” wrote the tax expert George M. Morris in the newly 
created National Income Tax magazine in 1923.50 
C. Reviving the ABA’s Tax Group 
Unsurprisingly, as tax law became more prominent and more lucrative, the 
ABA took notice. In 1921, the Association created the “Special Committee on 
 
 47.  MEHROTRA, supra note 41, at 351. 
 48.  ROBERT T. SWAINE, 2 THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS 248 (1948). In addition 
to being the firm’s in-house historian, Swaine was also a partner at the firm. 
 49.  Herzfeld, supra note 15, at 31.   
 50.  George Maurice Morris, Income Tax Practice of Lawyers, 1 NAT’L INCOME TAX MAG. 15, 15 
(1923). 
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Internal Revenue and its Means of Collection,” a successor to the ABA tax group 
that had been disbanded in 1916. Like most other organized bar associations, this 
new entity focused primarily on standards of practice and the process of self-
regulation.51 The tensions between client representation and civic duty did not 
appear be on the committee’s agenda. The stated goal of the new committee was 
“to obtain a modification of some of the rules and regulations of the Treasury 
Department, the Internal Revenue Bureau, in regard to the status of attorneys.” 
As Mindy Herzfeld has shown, the key contribution of the ABA tax committees 
during this historical period was their ability to help lawyers distinguish their 
status and contributions from other professions, especially accountants.52 
The national tax bar was developing its independent power and prestige at a 
time when the Mellon Treasury Department was pushing for a more “scientific” 
approach to tax reform. Led by Treasury lawyer Russell Leffingwell, who was 
among the key figures providing critical continuity between the wartime 
Democratic regime and the postwar Republicans, this new tax reform plan 
focused on lowering marginal tax rates to save the income tax rather than abolish 
it.53 Leffingwell, the former Cravath partner, may have been a late convert to 
direct and progressive taxation, but after the war he and his lieutenants convinced 
Mellon that an effective tax system could be committed to both progressive 
taxation and corporate capitalism. “The purpose of taxation is to raise money,” 
explained Mellon’s Treasury Department, “not only in the year in which it is 
assessed, but to leave the source from which the revenue is to be derived 
permanently unharmed, so that in the next year and in the years following, similar 
taxes will produce adequate revenue from this source.”54 
Like their Treasury Department counterparts, tax lawyers in private practice 
believed they could reconcile their pursuit of profits with a principled position on 
tax reform and administration. As tax lawyer Gilmer Korner explained in 1925: 
“The field is a large one and is of vital importance to our civic and business life. 
The lawyer who enters that field will have his rewards. The practice is 
remunerative, it is absorbingly interesting and last, but by no means least, there 
is the satisfaction of contributing professionally to a greatly desired aim—namely, 
wiser tax laws wisely administered.”55 
While individual private lawyers may have believed naively that they could 
simultaneously represent their private clients and provide general counsel to the 
tax system, leaders of the ABA tax committee were more anxious. Like their 
predecessors decades earlier, the new generation of bar leaders sought to avoid 
 
 51.  TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND 
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 52.  Herzfeld, supra note 15, at 36. 
 53.  M. Susan Murnane, Selling Scientific Taxation: The Treasury Department’s Campaign for Tax 
Reform in the 1920s, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 826–28 (2004); Lawrence L. Murray, Bureaucracy and Bi-
Partisanship in Taxation: The Mellon Plan Revisited, 52 BUS. HIST. REV. 200–25 (1978). 
 54.  Murnane, supra note 53, at 841–42.  
 55.  J. Gilmer Korner, The United States Board of Tax Appeals, 11 A.B.A. J. 642, 644 (1925). 
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the politics of taxation. In the 1920s, the ABA tax group specifically declined “to 
take up legislative matters; legislative matters were perceived as being within the 
province of the Association at large.”56 As George Morris explained: 
We have carefully avoided getting into questions of political or economic policy with 
regards to federal tax legislation, feeling, I think correctly, that there would be a great 
difference of opinion among the members of the Bar and of this Association in 
accordance with their political affiliations and in accordance with their economic ideas. 
Therefore we have confined ourselves to these subjects in which the ordinary citizen is 
but little interested, namely, matters of procedure and administration, but which vitally 
affect the practical application of the tax laws.57 
Once again the ABA was reluctant to address any topic that might be 
perceived as controversial.  Just as leaders decades earlier attempted to police 
the line between law and politics, so too did their successors in the 1920s.  
Taxation, in short, remained a topic to be avoided. 
IV 
NEW DEAL ATTACKS ON THE TAX BAR 
The 1930s opened a new chapter in federal taxation. The sweeping cuts of the 
1920s were replaced by a long series of tax increases. Contrary to the popular 
memory of the New Deal era, some of these hikes targeted the nation’s most 
vulnerable taxpayers; through at least the middle of the 1930s, regressive excise 
taxes on consumer goods—especially “sin taxes” on alcohol and tobacco—
funded a large share of Franklin Roosevelt’s expensive New Deal. In addition, 
one of the most important fiscal innovations of the Roosevelt era—the payroll 
tax used to fund Social Security—was distinctly, and deliberately, regressive.58 
The New Deal, however, also featured a series of “soak-the-rich” tax hikes 
designed to balance the scales of fiscal justice. Some historians have dismissed 
these targeted increases as merely “symbolic,” used to distract voters—and 
liberal intellectuals—from the more regressive elements of the New Deal tax 
regime. But in fact, while certainly symbolic, these high-end taxes were also 
vitally important, at least to many ardent New Dealers, especially a cohort of 
New Deal lawyers working in the Treasury Department.59 In their view, heavy, 
progressive taxes on the nation’s most fortunate few were the best way to 
compensate for the regressive excise taxes that most tax experts considered a 
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 58.  On the generally regressive nature of New Deal taxation, at least during the early stages of the 
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TAXATION, 1933–1939 (1984). On Social Security, see Mark H. Leff, Taxing the “Forgotten Man”: The 
Politics of Social Security Finance in the New Deal, 70 J. AM. HIST. 359 (1983).  
 59.  On New Deal Treasury lawyers, see Joseph J. Thorndike, “The Unfair Advantage of the Few”: 
The New Deal Origins of “Soak the Rich” Taxation, in THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY: TAXATION IN 
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fiscal necessity.60 
Soaking-the-rich had obvious virtues for liberals of the 1930s, both politically 
and economically. But as tax rates increased, so did the incentive to find ways 
around those rates, either through tax evasion or tax avoidance. The former, 
clearly illegal, was principally a problem of tax administration, and the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue was generally diligent about tracking down the lawbreakers. 
But tax avoidance was something else—a process of tax minimization that often 
exploited gray areas of the tax law. Sometimes administrative or regulatory 
action could restrain this sort of avoidance. But other aspects of tax avoidance 
required legislative changes to the underlying law. 
The New Deal did not neglect these legislative solutions. Indeed, Franklin 
Roosevelt made tax avoidance a leitmotif of his fiscal rhetoric. He got off to a 
slow start, however, choosing to simply cheer from the sidelines when Ferdinand 
Pecora, chief counsel for the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 
publicly exposed widespread tax minimization among Wall Street’s most famous 
bankers. Similarly, FDR confined himself to a supporting role in 1934 when 
Congress began a sweeping anti-avoidance investigation.61 The following year, 
however, Roosevelt made progressive taxation a centerpiece of his emerging re-
election campaign, and he vigorously championed the sharply redistributive 
Revenue Act of 1935. “Our revenue laws have operated in many ways to the 
unfair advantage of the few,” he declared in a message to Congress, “and they 
have done little to prevent an unjust concentration of wealth and economic 
power.”62 
The 1935 tax law raised rates substantially on wealthy Americans; according 
to estimates by historian W. Elliot Brownlee, effective rates on the top 1% 
jumped from 11.3% in 1935 to 16.4% in 1936.63 At the same time, the law was 
clearly symbolic, even going so far as to create a new top bracket (applicable only 
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But again, left to themselves, high rates—like the 79% applied to 
Rockefeller—tended to encourage ever more vigorous efforts at avoidance. New 
Deal officials believed that high rates, though vital, required equally robust 
efforts to curb avoidance, especially since many of the nation’s richest taxpayers 
were using expert legal assistance to devise avoidance techniques that violated 
the spirit, if not the letter, of the revenue laws. 
Tax avoidance among the rich—and the elite lawyers who made it possible—
grabbed the spotlight of national attention in 1937. Fresh off his resounding re-
election victory in 1936, Roosevelt began a very public, highly controversial 
campaign to shut down the “clever little schemes” being used by many rich 
Americans to avoid paying “their fair share.”65 
“A condition has been developing during the past few months so serious to 
the Nation that the Congress and the people are entitled to information about 
it,” Roosevelt told Congress in a special message.66 The Treasury had delivered 
to the White House an alarming report, revealing “efforts at avoidance and 
evasion of tax liability, so widespread and so amazing both in their boldness and 
their ingenuity, that further action without delay seems imperative.”67 
In his remarks, Roosevelt deliberately blurred the distinction between legal 
tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion, tarring them both with the same brush of 
moral indignation. “Methods of escape or intended escape from tax liability are 
many,” he said.68 “Some are instances of avoidance which appear to have the 
color of legality; others are on the borderline of legality; others are plainly 
contrary even to the letter of the law.”69 All, however, ran counter to “the spirit 
of the law.”70 Or as he continued: 
All are alike in that they represent a determined effort on the part of those who use 
them to dodge the payment of taxes which Congress based on ability to pay. All are 
alike in that failure to pay results in shifting the tax load to the shoulders of others less 
able to pay, and in mulcting the Treasury of the Government’s just due.71 
These were strong words—and they got stronger near the end of the message. 
“In this immediate problem the decency of American morals is involved,” 
Roosevelt declared.72 “The example of successful tax dodging by a minority of 
very rich individuals breeds efforts by other people to dodge other laws as well 
as tax laws.”73 
 
 65.  Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on Tax Evasion Prevention, THE AMERICAN 
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Roosevelt focused most of his indignation on the taxpayers engaged in 
aggressive tax minimization. Indeed, he and his allies were eager to name some 
of the more egregious avoiders, and they eventually managed to publicly shame 
many of them, despite the misgiving of Treasury employees who later resigned in 
protest.74 But the President saved a large dose of opprobrium for the lawyers who 
aided taxpayers in devising avoidance techniques. “It is also a matter of deep 
regret,” he declared, “to know that lawyers of high standing at the Bar not only 
have advised and are advising their clients to utilize tax avoidance devices, but 
are actively using these devices in their own personal affairs. We hear too often 
from lawyers, as well as from their clients, the sentiment ‘It is all right to do it if 
you can get away with it.’”75 
Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau echoed this sentiment when 
presenting the President’s ideas to congressional investigators. “[W]e have 
developed in this country a group of ingenious lawyers and accountants who 
make their living by showing to people who can afford to employ them ways by 
which they may pay the least possible taxes,” Morgenthau said.76 “We have now 
a bar of registered attorneys and tax accountants numbering approximately 
45,000. Against them are pitted some 2,800 field agents actively engaged in tax 
investigations for the Government. The contest is, of course, unequal.”77 
“This may be a legitimate business,” the Secretary acknowledged grudgingly, 
but it came at a steep cost—both to the legal profession and to the nation. “The 
ordinary accepted standard by which many wealthy taxpayers judge the efficiency 
of the tax attorney is the amount of that he can save in taxes,” Morgenthau said.78 
“The most ingenious attorney, therefore, becomes the most successful and the 
most sought after.”79 That success, in turn, eroded the tax lawyer’s sense of civic 
responsibility. “He feels that his sole duty is toward his client. If he is honest, he 
will not condone perjury, but he feels little moral or social responsibility to the 
government.”80 
Morgenthau—whose background was in agriculture, not law—was 
unimpressed by the bar’s ethical standards. Too often, he suggested, the 
successful tax lawyer put private gain over public service. “If he can invent a new 
scheme for circumventing the intent of the tax laws, which will be upheld by the 
courts, he is well within the ethics of his profession,” Morgenthau testified, 
“regardless of the unfortunate effect that such a scheme will have upon the 
 
 74.  Wash. Bureau, Two Treasury Lawyers Disagree with New Deal, Resign Over Issue of Fair Play 
to Individuals Cited in Congressional Tax-Loophole Inquiry, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1937, at A4. 
 75.  Roosevelt, supra note 65. 
 76.  Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance Pursuant to Public Res. No. 
40, to Create a Joint Congressional Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 75th Cong. 9 (1937) 
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 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 9–10. 
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general application of such laws.”81 
Morgenthau’s indignation—which simmered while Roosevelt’s tended to 
boil—extended to the ingratitude of the tax bar. Many of the nation’s most 
successful tax lawyers had received their early training while in government 
service. But “[t]he fees of the tax lawyer exceed by thousands of percent the pay 
of his opponent employed by the Government,” the Secretary observed.82 
Enticed by the lure of a more lucrative private practice, public employees left 
public service for greener pastures. “The Government then becomes a training 
school for many of its opponents,” Morgenthau said.83 
This was not Morgenthau’s only shot across the bow of the nation’s legal 
community—nor was he alone among New Deal officials in complaining about 
the ethics of the burgeoning tax bar. In the same set of hearings, Senator Robert 
LaFollette called out “smart tax lawyers,” while IRS Commissioner Guy 
Helvering referred derisively to “quack tax avoidance experts.”84 Lawyers were 
a popular punching bag for many Roosevelt Administration tax officials. 
Meanwhile, many elite tax lawyers tried to defend themselves and their 
profession. Of the most prominent—who eventually became a key Treasury 
official during World War II—was Randolph Paul. Creative tax avoidance was 
certainly common, Paul acknowledged: “Taxpayers and their counsel have not 
been found wanting in mental fertility and subtlety,” he noted wryly.85 Indeed, 
both groups understood that: 
[D]istinctions in tax law, as in other fields of modern law, are distinctions of degree; that 
taxing statutes place cases on one side or the other of an arbitrary mathematical line; 
that taxpayers may go intentionally as close to this line as they can, if they do not pass 
it. The line may shift, and the taxpayer may, to his sorrow, misconceive its exact position, 
in which case he must pay the penalty. But the line is “hazy,” and there is a fair gamble 
where the tax structure is complicated, where the question is one of degree upon which 
“reasonable men may differ widely as to the place where the line should fall,” and where 
this difference of opinion is one of feelings rather than processes of articulate reason. 
Sometimes one wins, and sometimes one loses. The game is, in the opinion of many 
taxpayers, worth the candle.86 
But Paul resisted any suggestion that tax lawyers were behaving badly in this 
game. “It must be remembered that a lawyer, when he is consulted, must render 
his best opinion upon the question he is asked, even if that opinion should be that 
the law has a loophole,” Paul wrote in defense of his profession.87 “He need not 
sell loopholes, but he must say that one exists if he thinks it does. But more 
important than this consideration is the fact that many lawyers of high standing 
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have been for years advising against most of the devices enumerated in Secretary 
Morgenthau’s letter.”88 If Congress was in the market for scapegoats, Paul 
suggested, they should look elsewhere. “The salesmen of these devices have been 
laymen and institutions who hoped to profit in one way or another from the 
suggestions given. Many tax lawyers are wholly occupied with the problem of 
telling their clients what a complicated revenue act means, and representing 
taxpayers in genuine contests in particular cases.”89 
Some voices in the popular press came to the defense of the bar, too. The 
Washington Post editorial page, for instance, chastised Roosevelt and his advisers 
for blurring the line between avoidance and evasion. “It would encourage clearer 
thinking and more intelligent handling of the problems of the tax collector if a 
sharp distinction were drawn between fraudulent evasion of taxes and avoidance 
of payment by legal methods,” the editors wrote.90 Faced with complicated and 
ever-changing laws, Americans necessarily sought help from skilled tax advisers. 
These advisers, in turn, “naturally take advantage of every opportunity which the 
law seemingly permits to avoid or reduce payment. There is nothing morally 
reprehensible in doing so; the system, not the individual, is to be blamed for any 
resultant loss of revenue.”91 
But at least one of Paul’s colleagues at the pinnacle of the tax bar was less 
sympathetic to his profession. Roswell Magill, who served several stints in the 
Roosevelt Treasury despite his generally Republican and conservative 
sympathies, was not especially impressed by his colleagues’ standards. 
“Americans are an ingenious race,” he wrote in 1938, “and apparently the same 
ingenuity which among engineers finds its outlet in mechanical inventions, among 
lawyers takes shape in a trust revocable after notice of a year and a day; in a 
personal holding company organized under the laws of Newfoundland or the 
Bahamas; or in a tax sale by an individual to a trust which he has created and of 
which he is a trustee.”92 
Magill did not believe that Americans endorsed the cynical view attributed to 
famed financier J.P. Morgan: “If the Government doesn’t know enough to collect 
its taxes, a man is a fool to pay them.”93 But Magill acknowledged that some 
portion of the public did embrace that sentiment—including some members of 
the bar. “[S]o long as that view is current among a considerable minority and a 
minority to which a considerable part of the community looks for guidance, the 
Government must necessarily make its statutes sufficiently knowledgeable to 
meet the minority on its own ground,” he wrote.94 
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In August, Congress acted on Roosevelt’s request, passing the Revenue Act 
of 1937 and shutting down some of the “clever little schemes” then in use.95 
Notably, the president and his family members were also accused of tax 
avoidance during debate over the bill, but the charges gained no traction.96 Yet 
the bill did not curb the process of scheme-creation. For all the public shaming 
that Roosevelt and Morgenthau directed at the bar, the law did not significantly 
impinge on the activity of practicing tax lawyers, wrote George F. James, Jr. in 
the American Bar Association Journal. “All in all, it is not a major legislative 
achievement, but it is a thoroughly workmanlike Act,” he wrote. “[I]t is another 
biennial effort by the United States Treasury experts to out-think private tax 
counsel.”97 
V 
THE POSTWAR DECADE 
World War II was a watershed in twentieth century U.S. fiscal history. The 
war transformed the federal revenue system and especially its centerpiece, the 
individual income tax. Long focused narrowly on the nation’s economic elite, the 
income tax became a broad-based levy paid by almost every working American. 
“The income tax became a vital fiscal weapon,” wrote Stanley Surrey and William 
Warren in Federal Income Taxation: Cases and Materials. “Almost overnight it 
changed its morning coat for overalls.”98 
In addition to its economic centrality, the income tax assumed center stage in 
wartime definitions of American citizenship.99 Defended as an instrument of 
shared economic sacrifice, it was cast by its defenders as the fiscal counterpart to 
mortal sacrifice on the battlefield.100 But even in the midst of this rhetoric, tax 
avoidance never quite disappeared from the landscape of American fiscal 
politics. Most notably, Franklin Roosevelt vetoed the Revenue Act of 1943 on 
the grounds that it raised too little money and created too many “special 
provisions” for lucky taxpayers. “[I]t is not a tax bill but a tax relief bill providing 
relief not for the needy but for the greedy,” Roosevelt declared in his veto 
message. Congress, unimpressed, voted to override the president.101 
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As the war drew to a close, lawmakers continued their efforts to soften some 
of the tax system’s sharper redistributive edges, especially its high rates on 
personal and corporate income; at its wartime peak, the top rate on individual 
income had reached 94%,102 and the corporate excess profits peaked at 95%.103 
The modest tax relief of 1943 was followed, in 1945, by a sweeping tax cut totaling 
$5.9 billion, or roughly 13% of total federal revenue. This legislation—the second 
largest tax cut in American history measured as a share of gross domestic product 
(GDP)104—featured outright repeal of the corporate excess profits tax enacted 
during the wartime emergency. It also reduced regular income tax rates for both 
individuals and corporations. Congress decided to leave most excise taxes at or 
near their wartime peaks but agreed to postpone a scheduled increase in the 
Social Security payroll tax.105 
Though large, the 1945 tax cut did not resolve fundamental questions about 
the shape of America’s postwar tax regime. In particular, it failed to address 
pressing questions about the nature and scope of corporate taxation.106 As Carl 
Shoup, a leading tax economist and Treasury official in the Roosevelt 
Administration, noted at the time: “The Revenue Act of 1945 makes no advance 
toward solving the problem of corporate taxation, high-bracket incomes, and 
other issues of equity.”107 At the same time, however, it depleted the fiscal slack 
that might be necessary to address those issues at a later date. Future reforms 
“will have to be made chiefly by putting on some one taxpayer what is taken off 
another, rather than by simply taking off taxes from someone,” Shoup wrote. 
That sort of trade-off would make any sort of tax reform much more difficult.108 
The changing political dynamics surrounding tax avoidance also complicated 
the prospects for reform. In a recent article that surveys tax planning 
advertisements in the postwar period, legal historian Steven Bank found a sea 
change in the moral status of avoidance. The rising respectability of avoidance 
was partly an economic phenomenon, he concluded, driven by the combination 
of high rates and an expanded tax base. In addition, however, Bank detected a 
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backlash against the moralistic arguments used to defend high rates not just 
during World War II, but throughout the Great Depression as well.109 
The ABA and its Tax Section were keenly aware of these changes, as well as 
the need for basic tax reform. And in fact, since the Section’s creation in 1939, it 
had developed a series of discrete proposals for changes to the tax law, most of 
them relatively technical and only a few touching directly on broader issues of 
fairness and economic efficiency.110 Indeed, the Section tended to shrink from 
such issues, wary of their political nature. 
A case in point arose in 1948 and 1949, when the Section considered, and then 
rejected, a proposal to allow individual taxpayers to shelter earned income in a 
tax-free savings account.111 Intended to bolster retirement saving by the self-
employed, the plan captured the Section’s interest but not its endorsement. A 
Section committee voted first to support the idea and later, after heated debate, 
to table it.112 Section leaders, meanwhile, stressed the need to consider “the extent 
to which any plan proposed by the Committee involves economic and social 
considerations and a shifting of the burden of income tax from some groups to 
other groups.”113 The Committee took the hint, ultimately concluding that the 
proposal “discriminates in favor of persons who are in a position to set aside a 
part of their earnings, and also because its operation probably would not be of 
substantial benefit to persons earning less than $10,000.”114 
The Section’s rationale for rejecting the savings account proposal was not 
unreasonable, nor was it inconsistent with redistributive concerns. But the 
marching orders given to the Section’s “Committee on Earned Income” clearly 
indicated a broader unease regarding issues with high political salience, including 
wealth redistribution or vertical equity concerns. Still, the fact that Section 
leaders took up the plan in the first place revealed genuine, if not sufficient, 
interest in having the Section engage broader issues of taxation and fiscal reform. 
By 1950, talk of fundamental tax reform was gathering steam in Washington, 
and the Tax Section developed an array of proposals designed to address various 
problems, both large and small. Most of these fell within the section’s comfort 
zone, being largely technical in nature. More important, however, the Tax 
Section was cooperating with the American Law Institute (ALI) in pursuing the 
ALI’s new Tax Project. The staff director for this project was none other than 
Stanley Surrey, who described for Section members what the ALI was trying to 
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accomplish.115 “The Project looks considerably beyond mere codification of the 
present law and mere restatement of present income tax rules,” he wrote, quoting 
from the ALI’s own statement of goals. “At the same time, the Project is not 
designed to produce a fully developed ‘model income tax.’ Such a model would 
require exploration and decision respecting many political, fiscal, economic and 
social problems—e.g., rates, exemptions, capital gains, tax-exempt securities, 
function of the corporation tax, percentage depletion, etc.”116 
This statement attempted to define a sustainable public role for the organized 
tax bar, albeit one that the ALI, not the Tax Section, would mediate. Surrey and 
his colleagues on the Tax Project were trying mightily to dodge the pitfalls of 
politicized fiscal debate without retreating entirely into the arcana of the tax law. 
Tax professionals had no special competency when it came to fundamental 
questions of economic fairness and social equity, they suggested, but tax lawyers 
did have something to contribute to the actual functioning of the tax law. “The 
ground to be covered by the Project thus extends considerably beyond the areas 
of codification and restatement, but it does not reach into the areas of political 
and fiscal policy,” the group declared. “In this broad middle ground fall most of 
the tax provisions, the proper development of which is vital to a desirable tax 
structure.”117 
Of course, the middle ground was not entirely devoid of political influence 
and activity. The ALI, for instance, might try to dodge fundamental, threshold 
questions about the advisability and nature of corporate taxation or the proper 
treatment of capital gains and losses. But the group still engaged numerous 
aspects of both issues, often with important consequences for taxpayers. Still, by 
avoiding the most commonly politicized issues of tax policy debate, the ALI—
and its partners in the Tax Section—were able to define a useful and still active 
public role for tax professionals. 
A. Offering Advice to Lawmakers 
In 1950, the congressional Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation 
invited the Tax Section to offer suggestions for the new excess profit tax then in 
development. The Section responded quickly, if awkwardly. With no time to 
develop formal recommendations through its normal procedures—which 
required votes by the Section council as well as the broader ABA Board of 
Governors—Section leaders instead provided “an informal statement of views.” 
This procedural irregularity, justified by the national emergency of the Korean 
War (which had started in June 1950) represented a new modality for Tax Section 
civic engagement. The resulting recommendations, while consistent with past 
versions of the excess profits tax, were nonetheless deeply political, since they 
touched hot-button issues like how lawmakers might distinguish “excess” and 
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normal profits.118 
More broadly, the war refocused Section members on the bar’s civic 
engagement. “Last June we were proceeding rather blithely and perhaps a little 
irresponsibly down a road of tax reduction, including the introduction of a bit of 
special privilege here and there,” wrote Harvard Law School Dean Erwin 
Griswold in the December 1950 issue of the ABA Journal.119 Now lawmakers 
were struggling to return the tax system to a wartime footing. “It is an enormous 
task to collect fifty billion dollars a year from any economy, far more intricate 
and complicated than is realized by laymen, and even legislators, generally,” he 
continued. “We are very fortunate indeed that we have the machinery and the 
experience, and a well-trained group of tax practitioners to assist in doing the 
job.”120 
The following year, members of Congress also sought the Section’s assistance 
during its high-profile investigation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Adrian 
DeWind, chief counsel of the Subcommittee on Administration of the Internal 
Revenue laws of the House Committee on Ways and Means, specifically asked 
for guidance on what his panel should be investigating. The Tax Section agreed 
to help, soliciting ideas from its members but also acknowledging the 
complexities of offering that sort of assistance. “Care will be exercised to avoid 
any violation of confidential relationships or possible embarrassment to the 
persons who supply such information,” the Section noted in its newsletter.121 
In 1952, the ABA House of Delegates endorsed a proposed constitutional 
amendment that would have capped income tax rates at 25%, except during 
wartime, and barred the imposition of gift and estate taxes entirely.122 The Tax 
Section does not seem to have added its own imprimatur to the proposal, 
although the Section’s newsletter acknowledged the “able presentations” of two 
ABA leaders who urged the Section to sign on. In that presentation, as well as a 
subsequent article in the ABA Journal, these same ABA leaders emphasized the 
amendment’s importance to the survival of modern capitalism—and took pains 
 
 118.  In previous experiments with excess profits taxes, this debate had turned on the appropriate 
point of comparison for wartime profits. Specifically, the issue was whether to (1) allow a “normal” rate 
of return on invested capital, taxing everything above that level or (2) to compare wartime profits to an 
average of pre-war profits. The most generous solution was to give corporations a choice, and that’s what 
the Tax Section informally recommended. See Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Taxation, Excess Profits Taxes, 
4 BULL. 19, 21 (1950). 
 119.  Erwin N. Griswold, The Blessings of Taxation: Recent Trends in the Law of Federal Taxation, 36 
A.B.A. J. 999, 999 (1950). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Taxation, May Meeting of Council and Committee Chairmen, 4 BULL. 
7, 8 (1951). 
 122.  For more on this proposed amendment and the broader campaign to undermine the income tax, 
see Isaac William Martin, Redistributing toward the Rich: Strategic Policy Crafting in the Campaign to 
Repeal the Sixteenth Amendment, 1938–1958, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1 (2010). For contemporaneous comments 
by a leader of the legal tax community, see Erwin N. Griswold, Can We Limit Taxes to 25 Percent, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Aug. 1952), https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/flashbks/taxes/ 
griswolf.htm [https://perma.cc/TNS3-NQAB]. This article served as a foil for Dresser’s piece.  
MEHROTRA AND THORNDIKE_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2018  4:34 PM 
230 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 81:203 
 
to note Karl Marx’s support for an income tax. “We have been following the 
Marxian tax doctrine,” complained Robert Dresser, one of the leading ABA 
champions of the amendment.123 
The amendment debate revealed a disjunction between the sometimes 
politicized role of the broader ABA and the self-consciously technocratic focus 
of the Tax Section.124 In the same issue of the ABA Journal featuring Dresser’s 
attack on the income tax, George D. Webster offered a laudatory retrospective 
of the tax section’s first fourteen years, emphasizing its technocratic contributions 
to political debate. “Since its organization it successfully has sponsored certain 
legislation and recommendation relating to federal taxation,” he wrote of the 
Section.125 “The legislation it has sponsored has been largely technical rather than 
of a substantive nature; and, as an organization it has repeatedly refused to 
support legislation in the nature of special pleading.”126 
Webster drew special attention to the comments of House Ways and Means 
Chair Daniel Reed (R-N.Y.) who specifically praised the Tax Section for its 
emphasis on civic, as well as professional, obligations. “These distinguished 
lawyers have devoted themselves unselfishly to this task [of tax reform],” Reed 
said, “not in the interest of their clients but in the general public interest of 
making our tax laws equitable in their application and better in their 
administration.”127 
Reed’s praise served to underscore the tension between client and civic 
responsibilities. Webster, too, acknowledged the “dual capacity in which a lawyer 
in private practice sometimes serves in sponsoring legislation—as a member of 
the Tax Section and as an advocate for his client.” But most lawyers knew how 
to thread the needle, Webster said “[t]he resolution of these interests, where 
conflicting, by Tax Section members has been, in the main, completely 
effected.”128 Webster went on to summarize the Section’s recent legislative 
accomplishments, concluding in sweeping fashion that the Section had become 
“the outstanding private group continuously devoted to the improvement of the 
revenue laws.”129 
Other leaders of the tax bar also expected the Section to play a vital role in 
defending the tax system from its often-voluble enemies. “As tax lawyers, 
whether for the Government or for private clients we have a great responsibility 
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in the difficult days to come,” wrote Erwin Griswold at the start of the Korean 
War.130 The key to meeting that responsibility was a recognition that taxation was 
a vital tool of modern society. “Taxes are not a necessary evil,” he insisted, “They 
are, in times like these, a downright blessing.”131 
An appreciation for the social value of taxation—even high taxation—would 
not conflict with a tax lawyer’s responsibility to paying clients, Griswold 
insisted.132 “I do not for a moment mean that the tax lawyers should not work for 
his client, help him minimize his taxes, and fight hard for him when necessary,” 
he wrote.133 “That is all part of our adversary system, which I believe to be in 
general a good system. Many tax questions are necessarily complex, and they are 
likely to be worked out best when there is an able practitioner making the best 
possible presentation on each side.”134 
But tax lawyers could not let client responsibilities blind them to broader civic 
obligations. “They should sell their services to their clients—I hope they do,” 
Griswold wrote, “but not their souls.”135 The Tax Section, in particular, had an 
obligation to protect the integrity of the tax system and work for its improvement. 
“We are rather quick to move to action when there is some portion of the law 
which affects some particular group of taxpayers,” he pointedly suggested.136 
“But we ought to be equally quick to act in the public interest.”137 
Griswold moved beyond this implied criticism to offer a more direct 
complaint about the Section’s public behavior. After praising the group’s past 
efforts to improve the tax system, he took pains to identify its failures. “In times 
when taxes must be high, it is most important that they should be fair and 
nondiscriminatory, that they should not be full of loopholes and special 
privileges,” he wrote.138 “Yet right now, in the midst of a real shooting war, we 
are apparently about to enact a new tax law which contains some gross, almost 
crude, inequities. Where has the voice of the Tax Section been on these 
matters?”139 He continued with a specific set of indictments: 
What about family partnerships and stock options? Is there really any decent 
justification for the handouts which are reportedly about to be given to a special 
few taxpayers on these matters? What about the gross inequities of the law in 
favor of the oil and gas interests? Is there any justification for adding to that 
discrimination now by the so-called “in oil” provision of the present bill? Where 
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was the voice of the Tax Section on that matter?140 
This litany of complaints was specific to the pending issues of 1950. But it 
implied a broader criticism of the Tax Section civic role. And Griswold was not 
the only one voicing such complaints in the years after World War II. 
VI 
THE 1960S AND BEYOND 
When Stanley Surrey stepped to the lectern at the Tax Section’s 1961 annual 
meeting and delivered the speech described in the first section of this article, he 
stood near the pinnacle of the tax policy establishment. From that vantage, he 
surveyed a federal tax system that looked remarkably like the one Griswold 
observed more than a decade earlier. The 1950s had brought meaningful reform 
to some parts of the law, and the 1954 overhaul, in particular, was broad-ranging, 
if not exactly fundamental. But in broad strokes, the tax system of 1961 looked a 
lot like the tax system of 1950.141 
Which made tax reform all the more urgent, Surrey told his friends and 
colleagues in the Section. High rates were chief among the lingering 
characteristics of the emergency tax regime established during World War II and 
reaffirmed during the Korean War.142 While Americans were dying on foreign 
battlefields, such rates had been defensible as a form of shared sacrifice. But once 
peace returned, those rates lost some of their elevated moral status. Even more 
important, Surrey pointed out, those rates had encouraged a proliferation of 
“special preferences and treatments.”143 (A phrase which Surrey preferred to the 
popular terminology of “loopholes” and that was distinct from his more famous 
concept of tax expenditures.)144 These preferences, both by design and effect, 
served to make high statutory rates less onerous for postwar taxpayers. 
Taken together, high rates and special provisions had compromised the 
vitality of the American economy and distorted economic decision-making. “Any 
tax system will necessarily have its effect on our business and social structure in 
the large,” he said.145 “But the present tax system, again because of its many 
preferences and consequent complexities, seems to have an undue and 
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inappropriate effect in shaping our society in many of its daily routines.”146 
The Kennedy administration was already moving to deal with some of the 
more egregious distortions, Surrey noted. These included preferences associated 
with the foreign source income of U.S. firms, business expense accounts, dividend 
and interest reporting, preferential rates on sales of depreciable property, and 
the special benefits showered on business organizations operated on a mutual 
basis, including cooperatives, savings institutions, and some insurance 
companies.147 
Surrey predicted, however, that even more fundamental change was 
imminent. The administration was developing a program that would “center on 
a reconsideration of the income tax base with the viewpoint of determining the 
extent to which it can appropriately be broadened, and a re-examination of all 
brackets of the rate structure to see whether the rates can be lowered as a 
concomitant readjustment.”148 
Even this larger program, however, would be only a portion of the broader 
task facing fiscal policymakers. Tax reform, Surrey insisted, was a continual 
process—a journey, not a destination. 
A complex society such as ours, ever growing and changing, must necessarily expect and 
demand that its tax system also keep pace. The changes now under consideration merely 
mark the insights of today, based on the research of the past. Those insights tell us only 
what we need today and parenthetically tell us that the needs are overdue. But what of 
the tax system of the years ahead?149 
Tax lawyers, Surrey believed, had a special responsibility to help answer this 
question, and the organized bar was the most obvious and appropriate vehicle for 
their work. 
Experts in other fields—be they scientists, architects, or business leaders—
necessarily took the long view, Surrey pointed out. But what about tax experts? 
“What can they say?” he asked. “[C]an they speak at all? Is the crystal ball far 
cloudier in the field of taxation? Is there even a crystal ball of taxation at all, or 
must we be content in taxation to forget the future and only try to make sure that 
we recognize when the present is becoming outmoded?”150 
In fact, Surrey believed that such foresight was entirely possible, and he 
challenged lawyers to help lead the nation into its fiscal future. Legal tax experts 
must educate both Congress and the general public. “Legislative change in turn 
means knowledge about the tax system that is communicated to and understood 
by at least the business and professional groups in our society, and as far as 
possible by the public at large,” he said. “For the Congress in the end must 
depend upon the existence of that general understanding if a change is to have 
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the degree of acceptability that will enable it to be made at the legislative level.”151 
Of course, political discussion about tax reform was common and often vigorous. 
But there was altogether too much debate, and not enough transmission of 
knowledge. “What we lack is a sense of realism and an effort to achieve 
perspective,” he said.152 
Tax lawyers could help fill that gap in public discourse, Surrey insisted, but 
too often they confined their role to narrowly focused client advocacy. Most tax 
lawyers abstained from any sort of disinterested yet vigorous participation in the 
fiscal policy process. And that was a shame, since it hampered not just general 
tax reform, but even narrower revisions of the revenue laws. 
Surrey offered an example to bolster his case. “Wouldn’t we all have regarded 
it as helpful and meaningful if even a few tax practitioners had said publicly what 
we all know—and indeed what was said by the one practitioner who appeared on 
his own behalf—that the expense account situation had become intolerable?”153 
Surrey hectored his audience. And even when tax lawyers chose to acknowledge 
abuses of the tax law, their remedies usually focused on tougher enforcement 
rather than legislative revision. Again, he offered several examples: 
Generally, the suggestions come down to more and more administration—without 
anyone stopping to think about what happens to tax enforcement generally when all of 
the revenue agents are busy in trying to apply section 482 to tax haven corporations, in 
pursuing the mass non-reporting of dividends and interest, and in auditing expense 
accounts to determine what are legitimate business expenses—a phrase the speakers 
never bother to analyze in the context of entertainment expenses. Nor does anyone 
suggest just how revenue agents, given their average skills, are supposed to arrive 
intelligently at arm’s length prices for all of the countless goods exported and imported 
through foreign subsidiaries.154 
Such problems cried out for a legislative fix, not simply better administration. 
More to the point, tax lawyers were well-situated to take the lead in arguing for 
that sort of reform. To repeat his crucial challenge quoted in the first section of 
this paper: 
[O]ur profession has constantly to be asking itself as tax lawyers—with a stake in the 
integrity of the tax system and with an integral role in the task of linking that system 
with our taxpayers—whether we are doing as much as we can to bring before the 
Congress and the public the needed objectivity and perspective. 155 
Surrey’s call to action may have been stirring, at least for certain kind of 
wonkish tax lawyer, but it was not uncomplicated. In particular, as noted earlier, 
it ran headlong into the attorney-client relationship. Tax lawyers had obligations 
to both the fisc and to their clients; when the interests of the latter clashed with 
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the needs of the former, tax lawyers were caught in the middle. 
Surrey did not dwell on this tension in his 1961 speech, but four years earlier, 
he had published an article in the Harvard Law Review that focused more intently 
on the quandary of the civic-minded tax lawyer. In “The Congress and the Tax 
Lobbyist: How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted,” Surrey tried to explain the 
proliferation of “special tax provisions” in the years after World War II.156 He 
considered the issue from several angles but returned time and again to a central 
problem: special provisions had many champions, including well-heeled lobbyists 
and deep-pocketed congressional constituents.157 But the tax system had few 
vigorous defenders. “The question, ‘Who speaks for tax equity and tax fairness?’ 
is answered today largely in terms of only the Treasury Department,” he wrote. 
“If that department fails to respond, then tax fairness has no champion before 
the Congress.”158 
In theory, Surrey pointed out, the tax bar might assist the Treasury in this 
thankless task, given tax lawyers’ collective stake in the tax system. In practice, 
however, the bar was often complicit in the creation of special tax provisions.159 
“[F]or a good many years the vocal tax bar not only withheld any aid but very 
often conducted itself as an ally of the special pressure groups,” he wrote. “Many 
a lawyer representing a client seeking a special provision could without much 
difficulty obtain American Bar Association or local-bar-association endorsement 
for his proposal.”160 In fact, many lawmakers had become suspicious of any 
proposal bearing the ABA’s imprimatur, he said.161 
Still, things seemed to be changing for the better. “The Council and the 
committees of the Tax Section of the American Bar Association are becoming 
far more appreciative of the public interest,” Surrey wrote.162 “The signs of a 
growing maturity in the Tax Section on these matters are constantly 
increasing.”163 But most of this maturity came in the form of silence. “[S]o far this 
change in attitude has been negative and limited to self-restraint and refusal to 
join with the proponents of special tax provisions,” Surrey maintained.164 “The 
Tax Section is becoming less and less a protagonist against the Treasury 
Department, especially on the more extreme proposals, but it has not yet become 
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Once in a while, Surrey acknowledged, the bar took a more active role in 
defending the tax system. In 1954, for instance, as Congress was reconsidering 
key elements of the corporate income tax, the bar had broken with its implicit 
policy of careful silence and argued against several proposed changes. “For 
perhaps the first time we find bar associations going before Congress and 
pointing out that proposed legislation will open up unjustified tax loopholes,” he 
wrote.166 But that sort of active intervention in the legislative process was still the 
exception, not the rule. 
The bar’s timidity had several explanations, Surrey wrote. One was 
bureaucracy: The Tax Section could only take a public position after a series of 
votes by annual meetings held in different parts of the country. Even more 
problematic, any such position had also to be approved by the broader ABA 
House of Delegates. “A body that has regularly approved a proposed 
constitutional amendment to limit income-tax rates to twenty-five per cent is not 
likely to understand the problems of special tax provisions,” Surrey noted 
dryly.167 
Ultimately, however, bureaucratic hurdles were minor compared to the 
constraints imposed by the attorney-client relationship. Some of these constraints 
were informal, almost instinctive. Lawyers had a natural tendency to take a 
client’s-eye view of tax policy. “They can readily perceive the adverse effect of 
the tax laws upon a particular client or transaction. They can then phrase the 
legislative solution they think necessary to remove the claimed tax obstacle or 
burden,” he observed in a comment reminiscent of Griswold’s complaint from 
1950.168 “But they are usually quite incapable of standing off from the problem 
and their proposed solution and viewing both from the perspective of the general 
public interest.”169 
This myopia was a function of inexperience, not poor judgment or dubious 
morals. Most tax lawyers were inclined to oppose special tax provisions, Surrey 
wrote, partly out of a legitimate fear that Congress would turn a wrathful eye on 
those who exploited them. “[Tax lawyers] know that in the long run the 
pendulum may swing and that a ‘loophole’ may be closed with a vigor that pushes 
the cure too far,” he suggested. “Even when their legal business requires them to 
lobby directly for a special tax favor for their clients, I doubt that most lawyers 
relish the task.”170 
Still, the client-centered perspective was hard to transcend. “Lawyers as a 
profession are deeply conscious of a duty of loyalty to their clients,” Surrey 
wrote.171 “In his day-to-day relations with other lawyers and with the business 
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world a lawyer does not act contrary to his clients’ interests. These attitudes of 
loyalty and protection are ingrained in the profession; their roots lie deep in the 
past.”172 
Reconciling client interests with public responsibilities was especially difficult 
when issues of broad public policy impinged on a client’s particular tax situation. 
But it was hard whenever a client sought legislative changes that ran counter to 
the canons of sound taxation, which Surrey typically defined in terms of 
comprehensive base-broadening and reasonable rate reduction. In such cases, the 
tax lawyer’s responsibilities were unclear. Did a lawyer’s commitment to the 
public good ever transcend her duties to a client? Or were the latter always 
paramount? 
“Must a lawyer seeking a legislative change believe the change to be in the 
public interest?” Surrey asked. “And if he does not, should he still represent his 
client before the legislature?”173 In practice, Surrey pointed out, different lawyers 
answered this question in different ways. Some were fearless and outspoken 
defenders of the public interest; Surrey cited Randolph Paul, an early leader of 
the private tax bar and a highly influential tax official in the Roosevelt 
Administration, as a case in point.174 Other practitioners chose to thread the 
needle, opting for a policy of considered silence in the face of dubious proposals. 
And a few, unconcerned with abstract threats to the integrity of the tax system, 
were willing to argue for almost anything, acting “as legislative advocates, with 
varying degrees of belief in the proposals they present and with stress on the view 
that a person is entitled to have his case presented to the legislature just as he is 
entitled to his day in court.”175 
Ultimately, Surrey’s 1957 article did a fine job of posing questions about the 
tension between civic and client responsibilities, but he never offered any 
definitive answer regarding the public role of the private bar. Indeed, he ended 
with the same sort of uneasy conclusion that he used four years later in his speech 
to the Tax Section. “Given these problems,” he offered meekly, “it is hard to say 
whether the tax bar can take a position of leadership in this area.”176 
The best hope for bar activism, Surrey offered, lay in relatively technical 
analysis of discrete tax policy issues, especially when that activism was conducted 
through intermediary organizations like the ALI.177 The ALI Tax Project, which 
Surrey had helped lead, sponsored important work on corporate tax reform 
during the run-up to the 1954 recodification and reform legislation, he said. “The 
most significant consequence of the Institute’s Tax Project,” Surrey wrote, “is the 
demonstration that lawyers working under procedures such as those of the 
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Institute can on most technical tax matters develop constructive proposals which 
balance fairly the interests of the ‘Government’ and the ‘taxpayer.’”178 
Surrey, in other words, returned to his rather modest conception of how tax 
lawyers might engage public issues without compromising client responsibilities. 
His prescription, meek as it was, at least suggested a way forward. In that sense, 
it stood in notable contrast to more ambitious, idealistic calls for public action, 
like the one offered by Griswold in 1950. Technical research conducted through 
ancillary organizations might not give the tax bar a high profile public role—
especially since it tended to sidestep politically contentious issues, like the 
redistributive impact of progressive tax rates. Such topics tended to dominate 
public debate over federal taxation, but they were a dangerous minefield for tax 
practitioners who made a living by representing heavily taxed clients. Surrey’s 
emphasis on technical research promised to give legal experts a valuable role in 
the policy process while sparing them the public scrutiny –and client 
complaints—that were likely to attend any engagement with more high-profile, 
highly politicized tax issues. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
In December 2017, as Congress was nearing the end of its legislative rush to 
enact a sweeping tax reform bill, the ABA sent a letter to key lawmakers 
weighing in on one of the law’s provisions: tax relief for passthrough entities. 
Congress was poised to limit the new tax break in such a way that law firms would 
generally be excluded from its benefits. The ABA asked Congress to reconsider, 
arguing that “all pass-through businesses should be treated equally, irrespective 
of their lines of business.”179 
The passthrough provision had been controversial throughout the process of 
drafting a tax reform bill, with many tax experts questioning its wisdom. As a 
result, the ABA’s decision to get in on the action, as it were, struck some of these 
experts as unseemly. New York University law professor Lily Batchelder was 
especially unhappy, and she took to Twitter to vent her frustration. “This is really 
disappointing,” she wrote. “ABA pushes to expand the already terrible pass-
through loophole created by GOP tax plans. It’s not ‘discriminatory’ to tax labor 
income at labor income tax rates. A case study in ABA representing lawyers as 
an industry, not good law.”180 
Batchelder’s complaint focused on the ABA’s pursuit of lawyer’s self-
interest, but it underscored the persistent tension described in this article 
regarding the civic responsibilities of the organized bar. Did the ABA deserve 
Batchelder’s criticism simply because it placed its members’ self-interest above 
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abstract notions of good tax policy (assuming, for the sake of argument, that the 
passthrough provision was bad policy)? Was it reasonable to hold the ABA to 
some higher standard than those used to evaluate trade associations, for 
instance? Did the organized bar, in other words, have a civic responsibility that 
trumped self-interest? 
That is the kind of question that has bedeviled members of the ABA, and 
especially its Tax Section, since the latter first took shape more than a 100 years 
ago. The Tax Section (and its predecessors) has been constantly drawn toward 
some sort of meaningful civic role, but its participation in major arguments about 
tax policy and reform has been constrained by a variety of factors, including self-
interest but even more often, the need to safeguard client interests. 
The Tax Section has often opted for a cautious sort of engagement with public 
policy debates, although many of its members have played more vigorous roles, 
especially but not exclusively on behalf of paying clients. The Section’s collective 
caution, when viewed against its members’ less constrained engagement, has left 
the Section vulnerable to both internal and external criticism. Among the latter, 
FDR’s 1937 attack on the tax bar—if not the ABA in particular— was the most 
high-profile attack. But internal critics have been almost as hard on the organized 
bar, if far less inclined to the sort of moralizing that Roosevelt preferred. 
Internal criticism seemed to peak in the years after World War II, driven by 
several factors, including a rise in tax avoidance and tax planning, a decline in the 
moral opprobrium attached to such efforts, and a real and pressing need for 
serious tax reform. As lawmakers dithered on that last item, the need for 
guidance from the bar seemed to grow, at least in the eyes of prominent tax 
lawyers like Griswold and Surrey. 
This article focused heavily on Surrey’s assessment of the bar and its civic role 
because he posed the difficult questions with admirable clarity. Just as important, 
he resisted easy, hortatory answers, like those offered up by Griswold in 1950. 
Surrey’s answer to his central query—who stands for tax equity and tax 
fairness?—certainly implied a more active role for the ABA and its Tax Section, 
perhaps a form of stewardship. 
But Surrey did not urge his colleagues to wholly abandon the cautious 
approach that shaped the first sixty years of ABA tax efforts. Surrey understood 
that the tension between the tax bar’s civic and client responsibilities was not 
easily resolved—or even susceptible to final resolution at all. The disparate duties 
of a tax lawyer must necessarily, if occasionally, create difficult situations for tax 
practitioners, especially when they are operating collectively. 
Surrey’s solution, such as it was, involved further mediation of the bar’s 
collective role, with organizations distinct from the ABA—like the ALI— taking 
a more active role in policy formulation. While somewhat tepid, this solution had 
the signal virtue of actually working. It may have relegated the tax bar to the 
fringes of public debate, but it offered civic-minded tax lawyers a point of entry 
when it came to reworking the details of tax law—what Surrey called the “broad 
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middle ground” of reform that proved so “vital to a desirable tax structure.”181 
Surrey’s solution was distinctly technocratic, reflecting his abiding faith in the 
value of expertise. It may also have elided the extent to which technocratic 
solution can obscure highly politicized agendas. It also served to exclude non-
experts from a vital aspect of modern democratic governance. As sociologist 
Isaac William Martin observed recently in the New York Times, “tax policy is too 
important to be left to the experts alone.”182 But in that sense, Surrey’s solution 
was fully consistent with the thrust of the postwar tax policy process, which 
privileged the role of experts from various fields, including law, economics, and 
accounting. 
Ultimately, Surrey may be right about the best way for tax lawyers to engage 
the policy process. But one thing is certain: no solution, no matter how 
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